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A MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR ANALYSIS OF
STEPPING STONE ATTACKS
Marco Antonio Gamarra
Old Dominion University, 2019
Director: Dr. Sachin Shetty
Stepping stone attacks are one of the most sophisticated cyber-attacks, in which attackers
make a chain of compromised hosts to reach a victim target. In this Dissertation, an analytic
model with Multi-Agent systems approach has been proposed to analyze the propagation
of stepping stones attacks in dynamic vulnerability graphs. Because the vulnerability con-
figuration in a network is inherently dynamic, in this Dissertation a biased min-consensus
technique for dynamic graphs with fixed and switching topology is proposed as a distributed
technique to calculate the most vulnerable path for stepping stones attacks in dynamic vul-
nerability graphs. We use min-plus algebra to analyze and provide necessary and sufficient
convergence conditions to the shortest path in the fixed topology case. A necessary condition
for the switching topology case is provided.
Most cyber-attacks involve an attacker launching a multi-stage attack by exploiting a
sequence of hosts. This multi-stage attack generates a chain of “stepping stones from the
origin to target. The choice of stepping stones is a function of the degree of exploitability,
the impact, attackers capability, masking origin location, and intent. In this Dissertation,
we model and analyze scenarios wherein an attacker employs multiple strategies to choose
stepping stones. The problem is modeled as an Adjacency Quadratic Shortest Path using dy-
namic vulnerability graphs with multi-agent dynamic system approach. With this approach,
the shortest stepping stone path with maximum node degree and the shortest stepping stone
path with maximum impact are modeled and analyzed.
Because embedded controllers are omnipresent in networks, in this Dissertation as a
Risk Mitigation Strategy, a cyber-attack tolerant control strategy for embedded controllers
is proposed. A dual redundant control architecture that combines two identical controllers
that are switched periodically between active and restart modes is proposed. The strategy
is addressed to mitigate the impact due to the corruption of the controller software by an
adversary. We analyze the impact of the resetting and restarting the controller software and
performance of the switching process. The minimum requirements in the control design, for
effective mitigation of cyber-attacks to the control software, that implies a fast switching
period is provided. The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
strategy when the time to fully reset and restart the controller is faster than the time taken
by an adversary to compromise the controller. The results also provide insights into the
stability and safety regions and the factors that determine the effectiveness of the proposed
strategy.
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For the past 20 years, there has been an extensive use of the Information and Com-
munication Technologies (ICT) in Critical Infrastructure (CI), as a collateral consequence
there has been an increment in the frequency and severity of cyber attacks targeting CI.
For example, the Stuxnet malware to the Iranian nuclear enrichment plant in 2010 [40], the
Shamoon malware to the Saudi Arabian Oil Company Aramco in 2012 [14], and the Black-
Energy malware to the energy distribution companies of Ukraine in 2015 [41]. An effective
Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is required for an optimal risk mitigation strategy.
SRA of critical infrastructure hinges on the ability to quantify the probability of lateral
propagation of cyber-attacks [15, 29, 62, 74]. For example, attackers use spear phishing to
identify a victim computer and then proceed to compromise vulnerable computers within
a security enclave using Stepping Stone Attacks. In these cyber-attacks, an attacker gains
access to a computer, from that position (stepping stone), attacks and gains access to some
computer that he could not originally have access, from there repeating the strategy getting
deep in the network, until some sensitive target is gained, in this way attackers make a chain
of compromised machines to reach a victim (see Fig 1). The victim only sees the last host
in the chain that makes challenging to find attackers from looking only the target.
The identification of the most vulnerable stepping stone attack paths is a crucial compo-
nent for and effective SRA. A viable risk mitigation strategy should find an optimal balance
between attack damage and response plan cost (mitigation actions), but also the selection of
the response must be chosen without sacrificing the system functionalities (mission) [27,38].
The most vulnerable stepping stone path encodes the number of stepping stones that should
be considered in a response plan for optimal security resources allocation [9, 73].
2The financial cost of a realistic response plan is constrained for a limited budget, and
the resource allocation must be optimized, for this task the information encoded in the
stepping stone paths provide to the defender an estimation of the financial cost required
for a remediation plan, many cost models of budget allocation have been proposed in the
literature; for example, if the response plan is to reduce the number of vulnerabilities and
exploits, the financial cost of the resource budge for this task can be estimated with a linear
cost model or an exponential cost model [42]. Also, the information encoded in the stepping
stone path induces a resource budge required by the attacker to disrupt the system that can
be estimated and anticipated by the defender.
Stepping stones are attractive to attackers mainly because it is easy to compromise a host
on the internet; it is difficult to detect, allows attackers anonymity (the actual attacker is
almost untraceable), and its scalability, even worse because Internet of Things (IoT) devices
have been growing exponentially and is estimated by 2020 that the number of connected IoT
devises worldwide will reach 20 Billion and that more than 65% of enterprises will adopt
IoT products [35]. The massive deployment of IoT devices bring new security challenges,
mainly because IoT devices have poor security or even none at all, typically do not run the
full-version operative system, are resource-constrained making traditional risk mitigation
strategies impractical. Provide security to the internet is already complicated, and adding
billions of insecure devices make the task a mega challenge.
The choice of stepping stones is influenced by the attacker’s goal, the increased difficulty
of attribution and exertion of minimum effort. The identification of attacker stepping stones





Figure 1. Attackers uses a chain {x1, . . . , xn} of compromised machines to reach a victim.
31.2 OBJECTIVE
The objective of this dissertation is twofold:
1. To develop formal mathematics models for risk assessment that quantify the propaga-
tion of stepping stone attacks in networks based on a multi-agent dynamical systems
approach.
2. Because embedded controllers are ubiquitous in networks: To develop control systems
strategies as a risk mitigation plan for embedded controllers to improve its tolerance
to cyber-attacks.
1.3 RESEARCH CHALLENGES
1.3.1 ATTACK GRAPH COMPLEXITY
For more than two decades, researchers have been using attacks graphs in network security
analysis, the idea of attack graphs appeared as early as 1996 [20, 44, 47, 52, 61]. An attack
graph is a mathematical abstraction that models all the possible ways that an attacker can
get access to a critical asset by exploiting a chain of vulnerabilities on the services running
on the hosts. Even when attack graphs can be efficiently generated [36,60], the resulting size
and complexity of the graphs makes its analysis and information processing a considerable
challenge; it is virtually impossible to know which paths and vulnerabilities are the most
important to the attackers success .
Depending on the node content, attack graphs can be divided into state-oriented attack
graphs or attribute-oriented attack graph. In a state-oriented attack graph, the nodes typ-
ically represent the state of the system during an attack (attack node), which may encode
how far the intruder has penetrated, and the attack’s capabilities at that point. An edge
from nodes si to another node sj exits, if there is a vulnerability that can be exploited,
transforming the system form the state si to the state sj. The problem with state-oriented
attack graph is that the number of states of the numbers of states will produce an “explo-
sion” in the number of nodes increasing the graph complexity and the computational cost
4for its analysis.
In this dissertation, vulnerability graphs, that are attributed-oriented attack graphs is
used. In a vulnerability graph, typically nodes represent hosts, and each edge represents one
way in which an attacker, who is on the source host, can gain access on the destination host
through an exploit. If vi and vj are two nodes in a vulnerability graph, and edge from vi to
vj exist, if there are an open port and a vulnerability in the host vj, such that the system’s
rules allow an attacker that is resident in vi to compromise vj. From a visualization point
of view, a vulnerability graph makes it easy to see how a chain of vulnerabilities can be
compromised, from a graph complexity point of view, the correspondence node-host reduces
the graph complexity. Even with this reduction in the complexity, the path analysis may be
an NP-hard problem.
The construction of vulnerability graphs hinges on the following: availability of network
connectivity; identification of software, operating systems, and network protocols; network
and system access control rules; and vulnerability information. The National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) and the Common Vulnerability Scoring System scores (CVSS) are typically
used to quantify the exploitability of the vulnerabilities [48,49].
Because attackers reach their objective by following attack paths, the analysis of attack
paths is a widely studied attack graph-based security metrics. In this venue, the Shortest
Path Metric, the Number of Path Metric, and the Mean of Path Lengths Metric are among
other the most studied. The Shortest Path metric quantify the smallest attack path from
an attacker’s initial state to the attackers desired goal state [21,37,59,61,68]. The length of
an attack path may be the number of exploits, the number of conditions or both of them,
or any other complexity score associated with them. The shortest path metric assumes that
the attacker is interested in using the least amount of effort to reach the goal target.
1.3.2 FROM HEURISTIC TO ANALYTIC MODEL
This dissertation has been inspired by [56], where the authors describe means of con-
structing models of networks, the access control mechanisms, and describe the software that
they employ to approach the problem of finding which stepping stone paths are accessible for
an attacker. The authors had used the shortest path metric in a vulnerability graph to model
5and analyze stepping stone attacks with heuristic estimations of the shortest path. The basic
idea of the shortest path metric comes from the attacker perspective, in the sense that given
the option of different steps than the attacker can penetrate and disrupt any security policy,
the attacker will choose the sequence of steps that require the least amount of effort. Effort
exerted by an attacker has been represented by assigning an estimated amount of required
time, resources to exploit vulnerabilities or complexity scores derived from them [37,56,68].
In [56], the authors describe a stepping stone attack as a path through a vulnerability
graph, and according to the CVSS, a scoring function for every edge in the vulnerability
graph has been constructed, called exploit complexity score that ranges between 0 and 10.
This score is defined in [56] as
 = 10− ε/Av (1)
where ε is the exploitability sub score and Av is the accessibility (vector) sub score (provided
by CVSS & NVD). This score (cost) quantifies the difficulty of compromise for each node.
The smaller the score, the easier it is to exploit the vulnerability. In this approach, a vul-
nerability graph has been constructed such that given a set of n node hosts {h1, . . . , hn}, a
weighted edge exists from hi to hj if and only if there is a vulnerability that allows an attacker
on hi to compromise hj. This weight ij is the exploit complexity score, so 0 < ij < 10.
A stepping stone path is a path through a vulnerability graph, here the edges denote the
vulnerabilities exploited by the attacker in the path that goes from the first node (attack
source) to the last (attack target).
The cost of a stepping stone path is defined as the sum of the costs of the edges of the
path. In this venue, the most vulnerable stepping stone path between a source node and a
target node is the path with minimum cost, and if the vulnerability graph is static, can be
calculated with the well known and efficient shortest-path algorithms. The problem of this
approach is that according to the experience, there is no guarantee that the vulnerability
scores (weights of the edges) will always remain the same during the attacker’s lateral prop-
agation, for example, due to defensive mechanisms that can result in modification to the
firewall rules, patching of vulnerabilities, and application of security controls. Also, if the
6attacker exploits a vulnerability in any host he gain experience, get passwords, certificates,
etc., then he can exploit the same vulnerability in other hosts with more simplicity, in both
cases, the vulnerability graph should change. Because the calculation of the shortest path
in a graph with switching topology is NP-hard, the authors in [56] had used a heuristic
approach with Montecarlo simulation to estimate the shortest path in a vulnerability graph
with switching topology . An analytic model for this problem that explores the conditions
in which is not NP-hard is required and has been developed partially in [23] and is expanded
in this dissertation.
Example 1.3.1 (Illustrative example). To illustrate the idea of vulnerability graph and
stepping stone attacks representations, we are considering a network that is composed of
three virtual servers and one physical server from [76] , the network topology is presented in
Fig 2. The configuration and function information of the servers are shown in Table 1. In this
example, it is assumed that an attacker takes the Root permissions in the target database
PM1 as the final goal to obtain business data. In order to achieve this goal, an attacker
can attack following many ways and means; see [76] for more details. For example, the
attackers can find the SQL injection vulnerability CVE-2011-2688 on the web server VM21.
Through this vulnerability, the attacker gets the user rights of the VM21 and establishes
a connection with the database server PM1 on the VM21 with a legitimate identity. Then
through the CVE-2012-2122 and CVE-2010-2693 vulnerabilities on the server PM1, the
access mechanism is bypassed, getting the root permissions of the database server PM1.
The associated vulnerability graph is presented in Fig 3.
In this context, the most vulnerable path that an attacker probably will follow is the
one with minimum cost, for example, the stepping stone attack Host 0, VM21, PM1(User),
PM1(Root) that has a cost = 0 + 5.1 + 0.1 = 5.2.
1.3.3 RISK MITIGATION STRATEGY
The dense deployments of IoT insecure devises have attracted the attention of attacker
making IoT devises as a target for steeping stone attacks in enterprises, industry, critical
infrastructure, etc., and because traditional risk mitigation strategies are impractical for IoT
7Figure 2. Network including 3 virtual servers and 1 physical server. The configuration and
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Figure 3. Vulnerability graph derived from the network presented in Fig 2. Every edge (a, b) is
labeled with the CVE ID of the vulnerability b and its ab score.








































VM23 Redhat 5.4 Host SSH CVE-2008-3234 8.0 1 2 09/28/2017
Table 1. Host Configuration, Function information and vulnerability scores information of the
network presented in Fig 2.
devises, a new risk mitigation strategy is required for IoT ecosystems.
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT
1.4.1 PROBLEM 1: MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF
STEPPING STONE ATTACKS IN NETWORKS WITH FIXED TOPOLOGY
To our best knowledge, the state of the art of the analysis of the risk assessment of
the propagation of stepping stone attacks is limited to heuristic models and simulations.
There is a need of formal mathematical models that faced this problem. In this dissertation,
a Mathematical Model for the Analysis of stepping stone attacks in networks with fixed
topology with multi-agent dynamic system approach is proposed [23].
1.4.2 PROBLEM 2: MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS
OF STEPPING STONE ATTACKS IN NETWORKS WITH SWITCHING
TOPOLOGY
According to the experience, a vulnerability graph is essentially dynamic; for example, if
a new application is starting to run in a host, may introduce a set of new vulnerabilities that
will modify the vulnerability graph topology in the number of nodes and edges. Also, there
is no guarantee that the vulnerability scores (weight on the edges) will always remain the
same during the attacker’s lateral propagation due to defensive mechanisms that can result
in a modification to the firewall rules, patching of vulnerabilities, and application of security
controls. Moreover, if the attacker exploits a vulnerability in any host he gains experience,
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gets passwords, certificates, etc., then he can exploit the same vulnerability in another host
with more simplicity; in both cases, the vulnerability graph should change.
In [56], the authors propose an approach to calculate the most vulnerable paths corre-
sponding to stepping stone attacks calculating the shortest path in a vulnerability graph with
fixed topology, and a heuristic analysis using Montecarlo simulations has been proposed
for the case of switching topology, assuming that when the attacker is at any host h and the
graph topology changes, the path from the host h to the target is invariant or equivalently,
as-yet unseen edge costs are invariant, then the standard shortest path algorithm can be
used to estimate the minimum remaining cost. However, this assumption may induce a
miscalculation of the remaining shortest path because there is no guarantee that the edge
cost will always remain the same during the attackers lateral propagation due to defensive
mechanisms that can result in modification to the firewall rules, patching of vulnerabilities,
and application of security controls.
In this dissertation, the assumption of the invariant of as-yet unseen vulnerability is not
considered, and a Mathematical Model for the Analysis and Simulation of stepping stone
attacks switching topology with a dynamic multi-agent system approach is proposed [23]. In
this approach, a dynamic vulnerability graph is introduced, which is a network of dynamic
multi-agent systems with first order dynamics [58]. In this dissertation, Biased min-consensus
protocol introduced in [80] is discretized for the calculation of the shortest stepping stone
path between any two nodes when the vulnerability graph is static (fixed topology case), and
when the vulnerability graph evolves in the time (switched topology case). The switching
topology case is modeled as a switched dynamical system where the vulnerability graph
changes according to a switching signal that is triggered by the network system defense.
Min-plus Algebra [78] is used for the analysis of the convergence the shortest path in the
fixed and switched topology cases. In the fixed topology case, a necessary and sufficient
condition for the convergence to the shortest stepping-stone path is provided. In the switched
topology case, a necessary condition for convergence to the shortest path in provided and
the scenarios where the problem is not NP-hard is analyzed.
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1.4.3 PROBLEM 3: STEPPING STONE PATH IN DYNAMIC VULNERABIL-
ITY GRAPH WITH CONSTRAINTS
Different models can be defined depending on the assumptions considered about the
behavior of the attacker [37, 59]. In a more realistic scenario, the selection of attacker’s
next step is not limited to the minimize the difficulty of compromise a vulnerability, for
example, an attacker may be interested also in minimizing the risk of detection as part of
his strategy. To model this scenario, two scores (weights) can be defined for every edge, one
that quantifies the difficulty of compromise a vulnerability and the other that quantifies the
risk of detection in that task. By having multiple weights on each edge or multiple edges
paths from every host, one can represent potentially-conflicting criteria in the selection of
the next stepping stone (e.g.the attacker wishes to minimize both costs of difficulty and
risk of detection). These kinds of problems include situations in which the choice of the
shortest path is constrained by other metrics, or in general cases in which the objective
function takes into account not only the cost of each selected edge but also the cost of the
interactions among the edges in the solution. In the literature, these kinds of problems are
called Quadratic Shortest Path Problem (QSPP). The QSPP is the problem of finding a
path in a directed graph from the source vertex s to the target vertex t such that the sum of
costs of the edges and the sum of interaction costs over all distinct pairs of edges on the path
is minimized [65]. In this dissertation, the models developed for Problem 1 and Problem 2
are extended for the analysis of the stepping-stone stacks with constraints.
1.4.4 PROBLEM 4: RISK MITIGATION STRATEGY
Since traditional networks are well-protected with stable defensive mechanisms, attackers
are now trying to intrude through the weak Internet of Things (IoT) devices to disrupt cyber-
physical systems. Because IoT devices operate deep inside of networks, traditional perimeter
defenses may be ineffective. Another problem in IoT ecosystems emerges because IoT devices
typically do not run full-version operating systems, require low power consumption, and
are resource constrained. Moreover, default passwords, unpatched bugs remain deployed
long after vendors cease to produce or support them. Thus, traditional risk mitigation
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mechanisms like antivirus, patches are impractical to expect in IoT ecosystems. Therefore,
in a practical IoT and Industrial IoT (IIoT) ecosystems, it is almost impossible to patch
up all the vulnerabilities existing in the devices within the network. To make the network
more tolerant to cyber-attack, alternative risk mitigation strategies should be investigated.
Unlike traditional IT ecosystems where host-based detection and prevention are prevalent, we
believe that in a Cyber-Physical System (CPS), to mitigate the vulnerabilities introduced
by IoT device, we need to leverage some intrinsic properties of the physical systems like
the inertia of the physical system, to develop a strategy to tolerate cyber-attacks. In this
dissertation, a Dual Redundant Cyber-attack Tolerant Control System Strategy for Cyber-
Physical Systems is proposed as a risk mitigation strategy [24].
1.5 STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTION
The contributions of this dissertation are:
1. A basic mathematical model for the analysis of the stepping stone attack as a network
of multi-agent dynamical system in a vulnerability graph with fixed and switching
topology is provided, where an interplay between biased min-consensus and min-plus
algebra is used for modeling and analysis.
2. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a finite-time convergence of the shortest
stepping-stone path in the fixed topology case is provided, and a necessary condi-
tion for the time interval between two consecutive switching signal that ensures the
convergence of the shortest stepping-stone path in finite-time is also provided.
3. A mathematical model for the analysis of the stepping-stone attack with constraints as
an Adjacent Quadratic Shortest Path Problem is proposed with multi-agent dynamical
system approach. The conditions for a finite-time convergence to the shortest path are
provided, and the cases where this problem is solved in polynomial time is analyzed.
4. To our best understanding, we are the first to propose a formal mathematical model for
the analysis of stepping stone attacks with a multi-agent dynamical system approach.
5. A dual redundant control strategy that switches two identical controllers to mitigate the
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impact of cyber-attacks that corrupt the integrity of the embedded-controller software
in critical infrastructure has been proposed as a risk mitigation strategy.
1.6 RELATED WORK
Attack graphs in network security analysis have been investigated since 1996 [20, 44, 47,
52, 61]. Various forms of attack graphs have been proposed for analyzing the security of
enterprise networks [3, 36,57,60,61,71].
In [56], vulnerability graphs were introduced with an heuristic model for the analysis and
simulation of the stepping-stone attack with fixed topology and a combination of Montecarlo
simulation with shortest path algorithms were used for the estimation of the stepping-stone
shortest path in the case of switching topology.
The shortest path problem in a directed graph has been formulated as a linear equation
in a min-plus algebra, which can be solved by the Bellman-Ford algorithm [22,78]. A variant
of the Bellman-Ford algorithm for single-source shortest paths in graphs that optimize the
algorithm, compared with the previously best variant by Yen [79], is reported in [5]. In all
of these works, the graph topology is fixed. Average consensus in network with switching
topologies is investigated in [58]. In [55], using max-plus algebra, max-consensus in graph
with switching topology is investigated.
The Shortest Path Problem with Variance Constraint that is an special case of the short-
est path with constraints, is studied in [72], and a general approach to the Quadratic Shortest
Path Problem (QSPP) is studied [33, 34, 64, 65]. The Adjacent QSPP (AQSPP) is studied
in [33,64].
In [4], the authors propose a defense strategy for CPS that takes advantage of physical in-
ertia to improve tolerance to cyber-attacks [4]. In [2], the authors propose an attack-tolerant
design for embedded control systems, using a proactive reset of a Simplex architecture [70]
with a proactively reset and switch between two redundant components.
1.7 DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION
This dissertation is organized as follows:
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• In Chapter 2, the necessary background needed throughout the dissertation are pre-
sented.
• In Chapter 3, a mathematical model for the analysis of stepping stone attack in a
vulnerability dynamic graph with fixed and switching topology is proposed.
• In Chapter 4, a mathematical model for the analysis of stepping stone attack in a
vulnerability dynamic graph with constraints is proposed.
• Chapter 5 is devoted to proposing a control strategy for the risk mitigation in a Cyber-
physical system, in this venue a Dual Redundant Cyber-attack Tolerant Control System
Strategy for Cyber-Physical Systems is proposed.




In this chapter, the basic concepts of graph theory, vulnerability graphs, a network of
multi-agent systems, consensus protocol, biased min-consensus, and other topics needed in
this dissertation are presented.
2.1 GRAPHS
Given a finite set V = {v1, ..., vn}
Definition 2.1.1. A directed Graph over V is an ordered pair G = (V,E), where E is a sub
set of the Cartesian product V × V . In this context V is called Vertex set and E is called
Edge set. Every vi ∈ V is called vertex or node and every ordered pair (vi, vj) of E is
called directed edge, where vi is called the tail and vj is called the head of the edge
Definition 2.1.2. A directed weighted Graph over V is an ordered triple G = (V,E,w),
where (V,E) is an directed graph and w : E −→ R is a function that associates a value to
each edge.
Definition 2.1.3. Given a directed weighted graph G = (V,E,w)
1. A vertex vj is said adjacent to vi if and only if (vi, vj) ∈ E
2. For every vertex vi is defined the set of all its neighbors as Ni = {vj ∈ V/(vi, vj) ∈ E}
3. A path C of length m in G is a sequence of m+1 vertex vi1 , vi2 , ..., vim+1 such that
(vik , vik+1) ∈ E for all k = 1, ...,m. If vi1 = vim+1 , then C is called a cycle of length m.
A cycle of length 1 is called a self-loop.
4. The weighted adjacency matrix associated to the weighted graph G = (V,E,w) is
defined as the square n × n matrix A such that [A]ij = wij > 0 if (vi, vj) ∈ E and
[A]ij = 0 in other case.
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Definition 2.1.4. An undirected Graph over V is a directed graph G = (V,E), such that
for every directed edge (vi, vj) in E, there is a directed edge (vj, vi) in E, this two edges are
denoted in a compact way as the unordered pair {vi, vj} and is called undirected edge.
Definition 2.1.5. A directed graph is said to be strongly connected if there is a path for
every two nodes, and it is called weakly connected if the graph obtained by adding an
edge (vj, vi) for every existing edge (vi, vj) in the original graph is strongly connected. An
undirected graph is connected if an only if is strongly connected.
2.2 VULNERABILITY GRAPH AND STEPPING STONES
Consider as network N with m host {h1, . . . , hm}. Each host hi has a set of applications,
and each application has a set of well-known vulnerabilities (eventually empty), and an open
port through an authorized, or an unauthorized user may gain access to hi.
Definition 2.2.1. A Vulnerability graph G = (V,E) associated with the network N is a
directed graph that represents ways in which an adversary can exploit sequentially different
vulnerabilities to disrupt the system. The set of nodes V = {v1, . . . , vn} represent all the
vulnerabilities of the network N and E ⊆ V × V is the set of directed edges of G that
represent the vulnerability relations.
If vi and vj are vulnerabilities of applications running in hosts hk and hl of N respectively,
the directed edge (vi, vj) on G, means that the system rules allow accessing host hl from host
hk trough the vulnerability vj. In other words, the edge (vi, vj) on G will enable an attacker
that is resident in hk trough the vulnerability vi, to reach hl trough the vulnerability vj.
Definition 2.2.2. The edge cost is a function ζ over the set of edges E that quantifies any
property related to exploiting a vulnerability, that is
ζ : E −→ A ⊆ R;
(vi, vj) 7−→ ζ[(vi, vj)]
In this dissertation, we will normalize all the edge costs to 10, for example, an edge
cost function over a vulnerability graph G that is used in this dissertation, is the exploit
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complexity score [56], defined as:
ζc : E −→ [0, 10];
(vi, vj) 7−→ ζc[(vi, vj) = ij = 10− εij
Av
(2)
that has a range between 0 and 10, where εij is the exploitability sub score of the vulnerability
vj provided by CVSS and Av is its accessibility vector. ζc[(vi, vj)] is denoted with ij and
quantifies the difficulty to exploit the vulnerability vj. The smaller ij, the easier it is to
exploit the vulnerability. See [56] for more details on the construction of this score.
2.3 CONSENSUS PROTOCOL IN A DYNAMIC GRAPH
Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph with a vertex set V = {v1, · · · , vn} and edge set E.
Let xi ∈ R denote the value of vertex vi. Definition 2.3.1 and Definition 2.3.2 are introduced
according to [58].
Definition 2.3.1. The pair (G, x) with x =
[
x1 · · · xn
]T
is called an algebraic graph
with value x ∈ Rn and topology (or information flow) G. The value xi of a vertex vi represents
any physical quantities or any other attribute of the network.




= x˙i(t) = fi(x(t), ui), i ∈ I = {1, · · · , n}
Definition 2.3.2. A dynamic graph is a dynamical system with a state (G,x) in which
the value x =
[
x1 · · · xn
]T
evolves according to the network dynamics
x˙i = fi(x, ui), ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n (3)
where
ui = gi(x), (4)
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is called a distributed protocol with topology G. In matrix form

























An algebraic graph is called an algebraic network, and a dynamical graphs is called
a dynamic network. In this dissertation a simple case of the dynamic network (3) when
fi(x, ui) = ui is considered, that is,
x˙i(t) = ui(t), ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n (6)
The next two examples are an illustration of a distributed calculation the linear function
χ(x) = Ave(x(0)) and of the nonlinear χ(x) = min(x(0)), using a dynamic graph (G, x),
where G is assumed strongly connected and Ni = {xj|(xi, xj) is an edge in (G, x)} denotes
the set of all the neighbors of the vertex xi




(xj − xi) (7)
asymptotically solves the average consensus and is called the average consensus protocol,
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(xj − xi) (8)








xi(0), i = 1, . . . , n
= Ave(x(0))
Example 2.3.2 (Min-consensus). The following nonlinear distribute protocol
ui = min
j∈Ni
(xj − xi) (9)




= −xi + min
j∈Ni
(xj) (10)
as is proved in [58],
lim
t→∞
xi(t) = min{x1(0), . . . , xn(0)}, i = 1, . . . , n
= min(x(0))
2.4 BIASED MIN-CONSENSUS
The following nonlinear distribute protocol
ui = −xi + min
j∈Ni
(xj + wij) (11)
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where wij is the edge cost of (xi, xj), is called biased min-consensus protocol [80]. Then
x˙i = −xi + min
j∈Ni
(xj + wij) (12)






which satisfies the following equation:
x∗i = min
j∈Ni
(x∗j + wij), i = 1, . . . , n
2.5 LEADER-FOLLOWER STRATEGY
In many applications of multi-agent systems, a leader-follower strategy is considered. In
this approach, a subset of agents is called leader set Nl, and the remaining agents are called
follower set Nf . In this context, the average consensus, the min-consensus, and the biased
min-consensus are x˙i = µi if i ∈ Nlx˙i =∑j∈Ni(xj − xi) if i ∈ Nf (13)
x˙i = µi if i ∈ Nlx˙i = −xi + minj∈Ni(xj) if i ∈ Nf (14)
x˙i = µi if i ∈ Nlx˙i = −xi + minj∈Ni(xj + wij) if i ∈ Nf (15)
respectively, where µi is an exogenous input. If µi = 0, the systems are called static leaders.
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The following theorem has been stated and proven in [80].
Theorem 2.5.1. Let G be an undirected connected graph, and suppose that the dynamic
network (G, x) evolves according to the protocol (15) with static leaders. Then the system




i = xi(0) if i ∈ Nl
x∗i = minj∈Ni(x
∗
j + wij) if i ∈ Nf
(16)
2.5.1 BIASED MIN-CONSENSUS AND SHORTEST PATCH
The relationship between the biased min-consensus protocol in a dynamic network (G, x)
and the shortest path in G has been developed in [80] as follows:
1. The “leader” agents are static, that is, x˙i(t) = 0,∀xi ∈ Nl, and are called destination
nodes. The “follower” agents are called source nodes.
2. If there is an edge between xi and xj, the weight wij of this edge is the length between
these agents.
3. The system evolves according to the protocol (15) with static leaders. Note that ac-
cording to the optimality principle of Bellman’s dynamic programming [8], the solution
of the considered shortest path problem satisfies the following nonlinear equations:x
∗
i = 0 if i ∈ Nl
x∗i = minj∈Ni(x
∗
j + wij) if i ∈ Nf
(17)
which are the equilibrium points of (15) with static leaders and xi(0) = 0, ∀xi ∈ Nl.
The following theorem is stated and proven in [80].
Theorem 2.5.2. If xi(0) = 0, ∀xi ∈ Nl, then the equilibrium of the system (15) with




1. When the estates have reached the equilibrium point (17), the shortest path can be
found by recursively finding the parent nodes [80].
2. According Theorem 2.5.1 and Theorem 2.5.2, all the states values of the system globally




MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF
STEPPING-STONE ATTACKS IN VULNERABILITY GRAPHS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, a basic mathematical model that attempts to quantify the propagation of
stepping stone attack is vulnerability graphs with fixes and switching topology is proposed
[23] . The model is developed with a multi-agent systems approach where the biased min-
consensus technique for dynamic graphs with fixed and switching topology is used as a
distributed technique to determine the most vulnerable stepping stones path in dynamic
vulnerability graphs. We use min-plus algebra to provide a necessary and sufficient condition
for the convergence to the shortest path on a graph with fixed topology, and a necessary
condition for the switching topology case.
3.2 ATTACKER’S MODEL
In this model, the following assumptions that are stated in [20] are used
1. A priory the attackers do not know the whole network topology ( whole vulnerability
graph). They only know the attacks that can be directly applied in a single step.
2. The attackers have a good memory. They remember all the sets of vulnerabilities they
already exploited and remember all sets of privileges they already acquired during the
intrusion process.
3. The attackers are sensible (intelligent). They will not attempt an attack that would
give them privileges they already have; hence, the attacker never goes back to an
already compromised state ( monotonicity property).
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3.3 STEPPING STONE DYNAMICS
3.3.1 FIXED TOPOLOGY CASE
Given a vulnerability graph G with n nodes {v1, . . . , vn}, a dynamic graph (G, x) is
assigned such that for every vi there is a state xi ∈ R and the weight of the edge (xi, xj)
is its exploit complexity score ij defined in equation (2). A leader-follower strategy is used
where the state xi evolves according to biased min-consensus dynamics (15) with static
leaders; in this model, the leaders are called valuable targets and the followers are called
source nodes. If xl is a valuable target, the state of the source xi is defined as the minimum
stepping stone cost from xi to xl, that is, the minimum length of the path from xi to xl.
Mathematically, the stepping stone dynamics can be written asx˙i(t) = 0, xi(0) = 0 if i ∈ Nlx˙i(t) = −xi(t) + minj∈Ni(xj(t) + ij) if i ∈ Nf (18)
then, according to Theorem 2.5.2, in the equilibrium x∗i ∈ Nf is the minimum stepping stone
cost from xi to any valuable target xl, that is, the most vulnerable stepping stone path from
vi to the valuable target vl.
As has claimed in [56], according to experience, as an attacker penetrates more deeply into
a system, the exploit complexity score should change; as a consequence, the graph topology
should change as well. A more realistic model where the exploit complexity score changes as
the attack penetrates more deeply in the system is developed in the following subsection.
3.3.2 SWITCHING TOPOLOGY CASE
Let {G1, . . . , Gm} be a finite collection of vulnerability multi-graphs with the same n
nodes {v1, . . . , vn} and s : R −→ {1, . . . ,m} a switching signal. For every s(t) = l, a
vulnerability multi-graph Gl ∈ {G1, . . . , Gm} and its associated dynamic graph (Gl, x) are
well defined, then the stepping stone dynamics with switching topology is equivalent to the
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hybrid system 
x˙i(t) = 0, xi(0) = 0 if i ∈ Nl
l = s(t)
x˙i(t) = −xi(t) + minj∈Ni(xj(t) + ij(l)) if i ∈ Nf
(19)
where ij(l) is the exploit vulnerability score of the edge (xi, xj) in the dynamic graph (Gl, x).
Hence if the network has a vulnerability graph Gp and at any time t > 0:
1. An attack from hi is detected in hj, then the network’s vulnerability graph switches to
Gq=s(t) such that ij(q) > lm(p) for all lm(p) = ij(p).
2. An attack from hi compromises hj, then the network’s vulnerability graph switches to
Gq=s(t) such that ij(q) < lm(p) for all lm(p) = ij(p).
The progress of the stepping stone dynamics is monitored at δ time intervals; hence, the




= x(δk), δ > 0 and k ∈ Z+0 (21)
and for the switching-topology case is
xi[k + 1] = xi[k], xi[0] = 0 if i ∈ Nl
l = s[k]




Min-plus algebra consists of two binary operations, ⊕ and⊗, on the set Rmin = R∪{+∞},
defined as follows
a⊕ b = min{a, b} (23)
a⊗ b = a+ b (24)
The neutral element with respect of the min-plus addition ⊕ is +∞, denoted as θ, and with
respect to the min-plus multiplication ⊗ is 0, denoted as e. Both operations are associative
and commutative, and the multiplication is distributive over the addition. Both operations
are extended to matrices as follows. Given A,B ∈ Rm×nmin ,
[A⊕B]ij = aij ⊕ bij, i = 1, . . . ,m j = 1, . . . , n










The identity matrix of size n is a square matrix denoted by In and given by
[In]ij =
e for i = jθ for i 6= j
If A ∈ Rn×nmin , for any integer k ≥ 1,
Ak = A⊗ A⊗ · · · ⊗ A︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1 multiplications
and A0 = In. For more properties and application of min-plus algebra, see [22] and the
references therein. If G is a vulnerability graph with n nodes {1, . . . n}, a modified weighted
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adjacency matrix A ∈ Rn×nmin is associated to G defined as
A =

[A]ii = e, if i is a target node
[A]ij = ij, if (i, j) is and edge
[A]ij = θ, in other cases
(25)
Notice that in this matrix, [A]ij 6= θ means that there is one path of length 1 from i to j in
G. Then in A2 = A⊗A, if [A⊗A]ij 6= θ, means that there is a path of length 2 in G with a
minimum cost from node i to node j; that is, there is a node l in G such that (i, l) and (l, j)
are edges in G such that mink{aik ⊗ akj} = ail⊗ alj = ail + alj, but also ail⊗ alj 6= θ implies
that ail 6= θ and alj 6= θ simultaneously, and ail ⊗ alj = θ implies that ail = θ or alj = θ.
Using the min-plus formalism, the stepping stone dynamics with fixed topology (20) can be
rewritten as xi[k + 1] = xi[k] = xi[0] = 0 if i ∈ Nlxi[k + 1] =⊕j∈Ni(xj[k]⊗ ij) if i ∈ Nf
or in matrix form as
x[k + 1] = A⊗ x[k] = Ak+1 ⊗ x[0] (26)
and the stepping stone dynamics with switched topology (22) can be written as
xi[k + 1] = xi[k] = 0 if i ∈ Nl
l = s[k]
xi[k + 1] =
⊕
j∈Ni(xj[k]⊗ ij(l)) if i ∈ Nf
or in matrix form
x[k + 1] = Al ⊗ x[k], l = s[k] (27)
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where Al is the matrix associate with the vulnerability graph Gl ∈ {G1, . . . , Gm}.
Theorem 3.3.1. A necessary and sufficient condition for which the stepping stone dynamics
(20) converge to equilibrium (16) is that Ak+1 = Ak for any integer k ≥ 1.
Proof. Sufficiency
x[k + 1] = A⊗ x[k]
= Ak+1 ⊗ x[0]
= Ak ⊗ x[0]
= x[k]
hence, x[k + 1]− x[k] = 0, which implies (16).
Necessity: If the system is in equilibrium for any integer k ≥ 1, implies that
x[k + 1]− x[k] = 0
or equivalently xi[k + 1] = xi[k] = xi[0] = 0 if i ∈ Nlxi[k + 1] = xi[k] = minj∈Ni(xj[k] + ij) if i ∈ Nf
hence,
[Ak+1]ii = [A
k]ii = 0 if i ∈ Nl
and
[Ak+1]ii = [A
k]ii = θ if i ∈ Nf
because in the vulnerability graph there are no self-loops in the source nodes. If i ∈ Nf ,
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and there is a path of length k + 1 from node i to the same target node j with minimum
cost





because xj[0] = 0 is the cost for a target node, therefore
Ak+1 = Ak
Corollary 3.3.1. If A ∈ Rn×nmin is the matrix associated with the vulnerability graph G and
there is an integer k ≥ 1 such that Ak+1 = Ak, then k ≤ n− 1.
Proof. xi[k + 1] = [A
k+1]ij = xi[k] = [A
k]ij implies that there is a path of length k from
node i to node j with minimum cost, equivalently there is a simple path from i to j with
length k. As the maximum length of a simple path in a graph with n nodes is n − 1, then
k ≤ n− 1.
Remark 3.3.1. Corollary 3.3.1 implies that the stepping stone dynamics (20) converge to
equilibrium in finite time τ = kδ with k ≤ n− 1 instant communications.
Theorem 3.3.2. The stepping stone dynamics with switching topology (22) converge to
equilibrium if the time interval between two consecutive switching signals is slow enough, as
k = n− 1 instant communication.
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Proof. By Corollary 3.3.1, n − 1 instant communications are the finite time period that
guarantee the equilibrium for any fixed graph topology, then if the time interval between
two switching signals is slow enough as n-1, then the system reach the equilibrium and the
shortest path is calculated, which prove the theorem.
Remark 3.3.2. In Theorem 3.3.2, notice that a convergence to equilibrium is possible for
any time interval between switching signals in less than n − 1 communication instants as
shown in example 3.3.2, we will discuss this point in sections 5.
The model was developed for a directed graph with the condition that there exists a path
from every source node to any target because, in general, a vulnerability graph is directed
and acyclic. With the purpose of illustrating our approach, in examples 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, an
idealized synthetic vulnerability graph that is strongly connected (undirected connected) is
considered and assuming that an attacker has, in theory, the advantage of compromise any
node in any layer of the vulnerability graph.
Example 3.3.1 (Fixed topology). Consider the 10-node synthetic (undirected) vulnerability
graph G presented in Fig 4, the exploit complexity scores are encoded in its weighted adja-
cency matrix M is presented in equation (28) and its modified adjacency matrix A defined
in (25) is presented in equation (29).
M =

0 3 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 0
3 0 8 0 0 4 2 0 0 0
0 8 0 4 0 2 4 3 0 0
0 0 4 0 3 1 0 0 1 0
2 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0
6 4 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0





















Figure 4. A 10-node vulnerability graph G = Gp with node 1 as a target node.
A =

0 3 +∞ +∞ 2 6 +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞
3 +∞ 8 +∞ +∞ 4 2 +∞ +∞ +∞
+∞ 8 +∞ 4 +∞ 2 4 3 +∞ +∞
+∞ +∞ 4 +∞ 3 1 +∞ +∞ 1 +∞
2 +∞ +∞ 3 +∞ 2 +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞
6 4 2 1 2 +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞
+∞ 2 4 +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞
+∞ +∞ 3 +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ 3 3
+∞ +∞ +∞ 1 +∞ +∞ +∞ 3 +∞ +∞
+∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ 3 +∞ +∞

(29)
If x1 is a valuable target, then the stepping stone dynamics isx1[k + 1] = x1[k] = x1[0] = 0xi[k + 1] = minj∈Ni(xj[k] + ij) if i ∈ {2, . . . , 10} (30)




x2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
x3 3 4 5 6 6 6 6
x4 2 3 4 5 5 5 5
x5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
x6 2 3 4 4 4 4 4
x7 3 5 5 5 5 5 5
x8 4 5 6 7 8 9 9
x9 2 3 4 5 6 6 6
x10 4 7 8 9 10 11 12
Table 2. Stepping stone cost evolution from every source node to the target, where every numerical
column shows the stepping stone cost from the respective source, for example, the row labeled with
the agent x8 shows that in the third iteration, its stepping stone cost is 6.
and the most vulnerable stepping stone paths from all the sources (shortest path) to the
target have been reached after seven iterations. For example, the most vulnerable stepping
stone path from node 10 to node target 1 has cost 12, and there are two paths: 10 → 8 →
3 → 6 → 5 → 1 and 10 → 8 → 9 → 4 → 6 → 5 → 1. The most vulnerable stepping stone
path from node 6 to node target 1 has cost 4 and is unique: 6→ 5→ 1.
Example 3.3.2 (Switching topology). Assume that at any time t1 > 0 a 10-node vulnerabil-
ity graph has topology G = Gp presented in Fig 4, the exploit complexity scores are encoded
in its weighted adjacency matrix M(p) = M as presented in equation (28). Assume that at
any time t2 > t1 an attack from host h6 is detected in host h5, then the network defense is
activated with a switching signal s(t2) = q yielding a new network topology Gq presented in
Fig 5, the new exploit complexity scores are encoded in its weighted adjacency matrix M(q)



















Figure 5. A 10-node vulnerability graph Gq derived from graph Gp in Fig 4 where ij(q) = 9 if
ij(p) = 2 and ij(q) = ij(p) if ij(p) 6= 2, with node 1 as a target node.
M(q) =

0 3 0 0 9 6 0 0 0 0
3 0 8 0 0 4 9 0 0 0
0 8 0 4 0 9 4 3 0 0
0 0 4 0 3 1 0 0 1 0
9 0 0 3 0 9 0 0 0 0
6 4 9 1 9 0 0 0 0 0
0 9 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0

(31)
The simulation is presented in Table 3 where the initial states are x(0) =
[0 4 7 4 9 8 7 8 3 9]T , the graph topology has changed from Gp to Gq in the
fifth iteration, that is, for k = 5, t2 = δ5, then s[5] = q. The most vulnerable stepping stone
path from all the sources to the target (shortest path) has been reached after nine iterations.
For example, the most vulnerable stepping stone path from node 10 to node target 1 has
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stepping stone cost/iteration
x2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
x3 44 8 6 6 9 9 11 11 11
x4 31 5 5 5 5 7 7 7 7
x5 2 2 2 2 8 8 9 9 9
x6 6 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6
x7 42 5 5 5 10 12 12 12 12
x8 33 44 11 9 9 9 9 11 11
x9 41 32 6 6 6 6 8 8 8
x10 83 36 47 14 12 12 12 12 14
Table 3. Stepping stone cost evolution from every source; notice that after the double vertical
line, when k = 5, the graph topology has changed and the stepping stone cost has been recalculated
with the new information.
cost 14 and is unique: 10→ 8→ 9→ 4→ 6→ 1. The most vulnerable stepping stone path
from node 6 to node target 1 has cost 6 and is unique: 6→ 1.
3.3.4 DISCUSSION
If r is the minimum cost from node i to node j, and s is the minimum cost from node
i to node l with r < s, equations (20) that are used in the calculation of the shortest path
provide r, and the paths themselves are calculated according to remark 2.5.1; that means
that the most probable stepping stone attack from the source node i is toward the target
node j.
In the model, a path between every source and any target has been assumed, but also if
there is a source without a path to any target, the equations (20) converge to the minimum
path for all the other sources.
Theorem 3.3.2 provides a time interval τ = n− 1 of instant communication between two
consecutive switching signals that ensures the convergence of the system to the minimum
path; notice that the convergence to the minimum path is by Corollary 3.3.1 k ≤ n − 1
instant communications, so the convergence to the minimum path could be observed and
detected with the equilibrium condition for k ≤ n − 1. As was reported in [78] and [5],
the Bellman-Ford algorithm can be optimized reducing the iteration in more that n/2, this
analysis is out of the scope of this chapter and will be studied in a future research.
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Chapter 4
MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF
STEPPING STONE ATTACK WITH CONSTRAINTS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, a generalization of the model developed in Chapter 3 that attempts to
quantify the most vulnerable stepping stone path when the attacker uses more that one
criterion in the selection of the stepping stones is proposed. Most cyber attacks involve
an attacker launching a multi-stage attack by exploiting a sequence of hosts. This multi-
stage attack generates a chain of “stepping stones” from the origin to target. The choice of
stepping stones is a function of the degree of exploitability, the impact, attacker’s capability,
masking origin location, and intent.
In this chapter, we model and analyze scenarios wherein an attacker employs multiple
strategies to choose stepping stones. The problem is modeled as an Adjacency Quadratic
Shortest Path using dynamic vulnerability graphs with multi-agent dynamic system ap-
proach. With this approach, the shortest stepping stone path with maximum node degree
and the shortest stepping stone attack with maximum impact are modeled and analyzed.
In [56] and [23], the models have assumed that the attackers exert the minimum effort in the
selection of the stepping stone attack as a unique criteria, and the most vulnerable stepping
stone path is calculated as the shortest path. However, according to the experience attackers
are not limited to one criterion in the selection of the stepping stones, for mention a few
examples of other criteria in the stepping stone selection we have:
• Stepping stone path with maximum node degree: To design an efficient method for
searching a specific file in peer-to-peer networks, the so-called maximum degree strategy
has been proposed [11, 12], this approach is based on the assumption that a node has
information on its neighbors’ degree. In the context of stepping stone attacks, an
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attacker that is resident in a node searching a specific file may move whenever is possible
to the neighbor node having the highest degree because the highest-degree nodes are
connected to a significant fraction of all nodes in the network, and the attacker would
need only a few steps to find a node that is a neighbor of the target. Then, the attacker
wishes to minimize the attack cost but also moves to the highest-degree node.
• Stepping stone path with maximum impact: Attackers may cause several kinds of dam-
ages according to the knowledge they have on organizations configuration and of sys-
tems vulnerabilities. In a stepping stone attack, the attacker’s damage in every step is
according to the knowledge they have on the portion of the network configuration and
vulnerabilities that they can see from his current position. Usually, damage evaluation
activities are estimated in two ways. First, directly by searching the specific damages
caused by the attack on the technological environment, which might be a complex task
to perform due to destroyed by the attacker. Second, indirectly by comparing after-
attack systems integrity to before-attack integrity; in this approach, a quantification
of the damage is performed, focusing on estimating the integrity impacts which is a
metric used by security scoring models. An attacker may wish to minimize the attack
cost but also look to maximize the impact.
• Stepping stone path with variance constraint: The attackers are risk-averse, and they
will not attack unless their perceived risk to be detected below some threshold [68],
in this context, the attacker wishes to minimize the cost and probability of detection
simultaneously.
The problems described above involve variants of the classic Shortest Path Problem (SPP)
in which additional costs are considered with the presence of pairs of edges in the solution.
In other words, the objective function takes into account not only the cost of each edge but
also the cost of the interactions among the edges. In the literature, this kind of problem is
called a Quadratic Shortest Path Problem (QSPP) [33,34,64,65], because it can be modeled
by a quadratic objective function on binary variables associated with each edge [64]. The
QSPP is the problem of finding a path in a directed graph from the source vertex a to the
target vertex b such that the sum of costs of the edges and the sum of interaction costs overall
37
distinct pairs of edges on the path is minimized. In stepping stone attacks, an attacker that
is resident in a host is constrained to exploit vulnerabilities of an adjacent host, that is that
the vulnerabilities of the host that are not adjacent to the attackers’ current position do
not influence the selection of its next stepping stone. This is a variant of the QSPP called
Adjacent QSPP (AQSPP) [33, 64]. In this chapter, we will develop mathematical models
for the analysis and simulation of stepping stone attacks with a maximum degree and with
maximum impact, respectively.
To represent potentially-conflicting criteria in the selection of the path in every step,
multiple edge cost can be introduced, and the cost of the constraints is incorporated into
the objective function, yielding an AQSPP problem [64,65]. In this venue, we will introduce
more than one score to the same edge for modeling, and analysis of the most vulnerable
stepping stone path. In correspondence with the related literature, we will call this problem
as Adjacent Quadratic Stepping Stone Attack.
The main contribution of this chapter is twofold:
• A mathematical model for the propagation of stepping stone attacks in a dynamic
vulnerability graph with multi-agent dynamic system approach when the attacker use
more of one criterion in the selection of the stepping stones is proposed as an AQSPP,
where an interplay between min-consensus and min-plus algebra is used for modeling
and analysis.
• The AQSPP is solved as an SPP, providing necessary and sufficient conditions for
finite-time convergence to the shortest path.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: sections 4.2 and 4.3 are devoted to
developing the model of the adjacent Quadratic stepping stone attack with degree and impact
constraints respectively, and Section 4.4 discusses the chapter’s results.
4.2 STEPPING STONE PATH WITH MAXIMUM OUT-DEGREE
NODE CONSTRAINT
As was mentioned before, according to the maximum degree strategy [11,12], the attacker
may wish to minimize the attack cost but also move to the highest-degree node. We will
model this scenario as follow:
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Given the dynamic vulnerability graph (G, x), where x = [x1 · · · xn]T . For every edge







where δout(xj) is the number of outgoing edges from node xj, called in the literature as the
out-degree of the node. σ2ij ranges between 0 and 10 and is classified as a node-centrality
metric that is proportional to the out-degree of the node xj, as closer to 0 is this score,
as higher out-degree of xj. Since an attacker that is resident in a node xi can scan the
information of the neighbors’ nodes xj (j ∈ Ni), and because of the maximum degree strategy
assumption, he knows the out-degrees of the neighbors’ nodes xl of xj and may select the
one with maximum out-degree. Then in the context of our model, for an attacker that is in
node xi, the following edge score is well known:
yj =

minl∈Nj(σjl) if there is l ∈ Nj
0 if j is a target
10 if there is not l ∈ Nj
(33)
and its interaction over the edge (xi, xj) is modeled by the score
yij = σijyj (34)
Then by (20) the stepping stone dynamic with maximum out-degree constraint influenced
by the neighbor’s edges (AQSPP) is given by
xi[k + 1] = xi[k] = xi[0] = 0 if i ∈ Nlxi[k + 1] = minj∈Ni(xj[k] + ij + σ2ij + yij) if i ∈ Nf (35)
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Using the the min-plus formalism yieldsxi[k + 1] = xi[k] = xi[0] = 0 if i ∈ Nlxi[k + 1] =⊕j∈Ni(xj[k]⊗ γij) if i ∈ Nf (36)
where
γij = ij + σ
2
ij + yij (37)
is a new complexity score for (xi, xj) that combines the properties described by ij and σ
2
ij,
but also the influence of the neighbors’ paths described by yij. Let’s denote with Γ = [γij]n×n
the MWAM that encodes the complexity scores γi,j, then equation (36) in matrix form is
x[k + 1] = Γ⊗ x[k] = Γk+1 ⊗ x[0] (38)
From Theorem 3.3.1, Corollary 3.3.1, and Remark 2.5.1 equation (38) converges to the
equilibrium if and only if Γk+1 = Γk for any k ≥ 1, and the following theorem has been
proved.
Theorem 4.2.1. Equation (38) converges to the shortest path with maximum node-degree if
and only if Γk+1 = Γk for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 4.2.1 is stated in the following result.
Corollary 4.2.1. The AQSPP defined by equation (32)-(37) can be solved as the SPP with
(38)
4.3 STEPPING STONE ATTACK WITH MAXIMUM IMPACT
CONSTRAINT
For every edge (xi, xj) we introduce the impact complexity score σˆ
2
ij defined as
σˆ2ij = 10− ψ(xj) (39)
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where ψ(xj) is the impact subscore of xj provided by CVSS, and assuming that every node
has information about the vulnerabilities of the neighbors’ nodes, then in the context of
our model, if an attacker is a resident in a node xi scanning a neighbors node xj, because
of our assumption, xj has the vulnerabilities information about its neighbors’ nodes xl,
then the scores yˆl and yˆij for (xi, xj) defined by equations (33) and (34) respectively with
σˆij instead of σij are well known for the attacker. Then the shortest path with maximum
impact influenced by its adjacent edges is given by equation (36) with the new complexity
score γˆij = ij + σˆ
2
ij + yˆij instead of γij. Denoting with Γˆ = [γˆij]n×n the MWAM that encodes
the complexity scores γˆij, then the following result can be stated.
Theorem 4.3.1. Equation (38) with Γˆ instead of Γ, converges to the shortest path with
maximum impact if and only if Γˆk+1 = Γˆk for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 4.3.1 is a result identical to Corollary 4.2.1 , with
γˆij instead of γij.




ij) can be multiplied by constants α
and β respectively, to describe the influence of the constraint in the attackers’ strategy, the
estimation of this constants may be according to modelers’ experience or historical data.
4.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For an illustration of our approach, a portion of a solar network integrated with an
industrial plant control network like that one presented in [25] is considered as a strategic
space for attackers potential propagation [75]. Its vulnerability graph is presented in Fig 6.
In Table 4, the information of the nodes IDs and its vulnerabilities are presented, the source
of the attack is node 12, and the target is node 1 (SCADA server). Table 5 summarizes the
simulation using our approach, and are described in more detail as following:
First, using only the exploit complexity score ij that encode a unique attackers’ strategy,
the most vulnerable stepping stone path is calculated with the equation (18) as the SPP from




Devise Vulnerability ε Av  ψ
NVD Last
Modified
1 SCADA Server CVE-2010-2772 3.4 0.395 1.4 10 08/16/2017
2 F& P Server CVE-2008-0405 10 1 0 10 10/15/2018
3 CISCO ASA CVE-2002-1278 10 1 0 6.4 09/10/2018
4 Active Directory CVE-1999-0504 10 1 0 6.4 09/09/2008
5 Payment Gateway CVE-2015-0075 3.9 0.395 0.1 10 10/12/2018
6 Mail Server CVE-2002-1278 10 1 0 6.4 09/10/2008
7 LAN User CVE-2017-11783 3.4 0.395 1.4 10 11/03/2017












CVE-2017-9861 3.9 1 6.1 5.9 08/21/2017
12 Attacker Source
Table 4. Vulnerabilities of the devices corresponding to the IIOT network presented in Fig 6,
where ε is the exploitability sub score, Av is the accessibility sub score, and ψ is the impact sub
score, provided by CVSS, and  is the exploit complexity score.
edge
score





ij Any from from 12 to 1 8.89 48.7-55.9 6-10
γij
12→ 11→ 9→ 8→ 7→ 2→ 1
12→ 10→ 9→ 8→ 7→ 2→ 1 104.91 55.9 10
γˆij
12→ 11→ 9→ 8→ 7→ 2→ 1
12→ 10→ 9→ 8→ 7→ 2→ 1 21.63 55.9 10
Table 5. Simulation results.
all have the same cost 8.89. Some of the shortest paths have a minimum impact cost of 48.7
and others have a maximum of 55.9, the out-degree cost for some of them is 6 (the minimum)
and for others is 10 (the maximum). This result is a usual shortcoming of the use of only
one edge cost with the shortest path metric; in general, the shortest path metric does not
indicate the number of shortest paths that may exist in a network, and in consequence, a
network administrator may arrive at an erroneous result.






















Figure 6. Vulnerability graph of a portion of an Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT) . The edges
are labeled with the complexity scores γij .
(38) gives us two shortest paths, then the most vulnerable stepping stone path with maximum
out-degree node (shortest path with maximum out-degree node) from node 12 to the target
are given by 12 → 11 (or 10) → 9 → 8 → 7 → 2 → 1 with cost 104.91, both paths has the
maximum out-degree cost of 10, and impact cost of 55.9.
Third, using the exploit complexity score γˆij that encodes two attackers strategies, equa-
tion (38) with Γˆ instead of Γ provides two shortest paths, then the most vulnerable stepping
stone path with maximum impact (shortest path with maximum impact) from node 12 to
the target are 12 → 11 → 9 → 8 → 7 → 2 → 1 with cost 21.63, out-degree cost of 10, and
impact cost of 55.9.
The effort exerted by an attacker to exploit vulnerabilities has been represented by assign-
ing the exploit complexity score ij. The intuition underlying the shortest path is that from
the perspective of the attacker; given the option of different stepping stones, the attacker
will choose the series of stepping stones that require the least amount of effort. Resources of
an attacker may include but are not limited to, tenacity, skills, and money. Our simulation
results described in the second and third part, show that if an attacker is not constrained to
the minimum effort (attacker with full resources), that is, if the attacker wants to use more
the one criteria in the selection of the stepping stones, the most vulnerable paths may be
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different from the paths with only one strategy. More elaborated scores can be introduced
to describe more multiple criteria in the selection of the stepping stone by the attackers; our
model provides one way to use one strategy and take any other as a constraint.
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Chapter 5
A RISK MITIGATION STRATEGY: DUAL REDUNDANT
CYBER-ATTACK TOLERANT CONTROL SYSTEMS
STRATEGY FOR CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In the last 20 years, remote cyber-attacks to Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) have been
reported, to mention a few of them:
• In 2010, a group of researchers showed that they could remotely inject messages into the
Controller Area Network (CAN bus) of a vehicle and attack the physical components,
like killing the engine and affecting braking [17].
• In 2015, the BlackEnergy malware attacked the energy distribution companies of
Ukraine. Here the attackers used spear-fishing to gain access to the internal network
utilizing a chain of compromised machines (stepping stones) to move laterally to the
corporate network and gain access to the SCADA control system to trip breakers in
substations [41].
• In 2010, the Stuxnet malware to the Iranian nuclear enrichment plant in 2010 [40],
in this case the malware, executed by removable drives use a chain of compromised
machines reaching and reprogramming the Programmable Logical devises (PLC).
• Many cyber-attacks vulnerabilities have been reported to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAV) [39], and actual cyber-attacks to UAV have been reported. For example, in 2009,
adversaries hacked a predator drone feeds in Iraq. In 2011, a US RQ-170 Sentinel UAV
was captured in Iran. [28].
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Also, since traditional networks are well-protected with stable defensive mechanisms,
attackers are now trying to intrude through the weak Internet of Things (IoT) devices to
disrupt CPS. In this chapter, embedded controllers that are a sensitive target for stepping
stone attacks are considered, and a mitigation plan is proposed. Fig 7 present an example
of a network attack scenario to an ICS like one provided in [75] where the PLC and RTU
are sensitive targets; the attacks follow a chain of compromised machines.
In this chapter, a cyber-attack tolerant control strategy for embedded controllers in
a CPS is presented. A dual redundant control architecture that combines two identical
controllers that are switched periodically between active and restart modes is proposed. The
strategy is addressed to mitigate the impact due to corruption of the controller software by
an adversary. We analyze the impact of the resetting and restarting the controller software
and performance of switching process. The minimum requirements in the control design, for
effective mitigation of cyber-attacks to the control software, which implies a “fast” switching
period, is provided. The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
strategy when the time to fully reset and restart the controller is faster than the time taken
by adversary to compromise the controller. The results also provide insights into the stability
and safety regions and the factors that determine the effectiveness of the proposed strategy.
CPS are comprised of integrated computational and physical components and processes
to support a wide range of applications in military and commercial domains. The ubiquity
of CPS systems has attracted attacks on the sensors, actuators, controller, and network
components. The state-of-the-art CPS security defense mechanisms are either focused on
protecting the physical component (sensors and actuators) or the cyber component (network
protocol, control algorithm, communication software). These defenses approach only leverage
the properties of physical components or employ IT security defenses to protect the cyber
components. There is a need for CPS security defenses to leverage the unique properties of
CPS.
Recently, a group of researchers proposed a defense strategy for CPS that takes advantage
of physical inertia to improve tolerance to cyber-attacks [4]. The inertia here represents the
ability of CPS to stay in motion or at rest for some time of period after partial or total loss
of its control input and its resilience to bounded transient imperfections emerging from the
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physical component.
The authors in [4] proposed a technique that frequently resets the controller software,
thereby maintaining the safety of the CPS. For example, if the proposed system is deployed
on a quadcopter, once a cyber-attack is detected, one can reset the controller software and
leverage the quadcopter’s physical inertia to continue the flight motion until the controller is
back online. However, several research questions must be answered to practically deploy the
combination of resetting a controller and leveraging the inertia of the physical system. In
particular, frequent resets could destabilize the physical operation and cause fatal failures.
In addition, by the time the controller is back online, the physical system could fail and cause
catastrophic damage. Finally, we need to address the range of impacts a physical system
would undergo in the presence of diverse cyber-attacks on the controller software.
In [2], the authors have proposed an attack-tolerant design for embedded control systems,
using a proactive reset of a Simplex architecture [70]. In [2], the authors proactively reset and
switch between two redundant components; One of them is a complex control component
for high performance, possibly unverifiable, which usually generates safe output; the other
one a trustworthy control component that has been verified and produces safe inputs all the
time. But also, the authors have proposed a safe time window to restart the controllers in
order to protect the safety of the physical system. However, the system proposed in [2] is a
switched system, and the impact of resetting and restarting the controllers on the physical
plant must be analyzed in this context. Many research questions under the switching control
system approach have not been addressed; for example, the dwell time for the controllers that
guarantee the physical plant stability, also, the switched system might become unstable for
certain switching signals, even if all the individual subsystems are asymptotically stable [43].
There is a need to leverage the switched system theory to understand the impact of reset
and restart controllers in the physical plant.
Inspired by the Stuxnet attack scenario, where the malware had propagated node to node
thought the Operational Technology (OT) zones to sabotage the Iranian nuclear enrich-
ment plant by reprogramming the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) [40], this chapter
leverages the dual redundant fault-tolerant control system designed, the stability theory for
switched systems, and the intrinsic inertial of physical components in a CPS in order to
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design a cyber-attack tolerant control strategy. The case wherein an embedded controller
of a cyber-physical system is hijacked trough a chain of compromised host, and a harmful
control signal is injected into the control loop is considered. Fig 7 present an example of
propagation of a malware in an Industrial Control System (ICS) [75], and Fig 8 presents an
schematic of an attack scenario to an embedded system. In this chapter, a proactive reset
of a two redundant controller is proposed as a cyber-attack tolerant control strategy. This
chapter is based in [24] that was inspired by the work proposed in [2]; however, the main
difference with [2] is that we reset, restart and switch the controllers proactively, and we
also provide a formal analysis of the strategy under a switched control system point of view,
providing the minimum requirements for the system’s architecture that guarantee stability,
and acceptable performance of a CPS under cyber-attack.
5.1.1 STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTION
The chapter contribution is as follows;
• A dual redundant control strategy that proactively switches two identical high-
performance controllers is proposed to mitigate the impact of cyber-attacks that cor-
rupt the integrity of the controller software in CPS.
• The system is analyzed from a switched systems point of view.
• The minimum requirements for the control design that guarantee the success of the
control strategy are provided.
• The requirements that guarantee stability for any “dwell time” that implies “fast
switching” is discussed and presented as a function of the time required for fully reset-
ting and restarting the controller platform.
• Simulations of the proposed strategy are presented that includes optimal calculation
of the stability and safety regions.
Maintain the safety of physical components against possible software faults is widely
studied in the fault-tolerant literature of CPS. Is worthy of mentioning that even with the
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Figure 7. Stepping stone attack propagation in a ICS. The PLC or the RTU may be the sensitive
target of the attack
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similarities, there are fundamental differences between the approach to protecting a CPS
from a fault and from cyber-attacks that we summarize as follow.
First
• In the scope of this dissertation a fault refers software faults that is a structural im-
perfection in the software implementation (bugs in the software implementation) that
may cause the software to work poorly, produce incorrect results or crash, cascading
equivalents result in the physical components of a CPS. The fault-tolerance to this
kind of faults is achieved usually by systems based in redundancy like the Simplex
architecture approach [10,63,69,70].
• Adverse environments like lighting-charged environment and Hight Intensity Radiation
Fields(HIRF) environments caused by Radio Frequency (RF) transmitters, radars,
personal electronics devices and electromagnetic incompatibilities equipment installed
in CPS may cause functional mode errors or upsets in embedded systems. This upset
may degrade the performance of embedded systems in CPS [6, 7, 18, 77]. Embedded
systems upset is permanent in the sense that it requires corrective action, such as
resetting the system or reloading the software. Here the fault tolerance is achieved
usually thought systems based in redundancy like the Scalable Processor-Independent
Design for Electromagnetic Resilience (SPIDER) [26,50,66,67].
• All the fault-tolerance design assumes that software faults are possible only within a
subset of the software system. This assumption is not valid for systems under cyber-
attacks. In cyber-attacks, attackers can disrupt all the software layers [2].
• The kind of fault that includes physical issues like broken sensors, actuators etc. is not
in the scope of this dissertation.
Second
• A fault is a random process.
• A cyber-attacks is a software designed with a specific purpose to deliver an inaccurate
result, degrade, destroy, etc. a particular process or component in a CPS.
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Third
• In any fault-tolerant design, the switching process, which select and switch the re-
dundant modules, is triggered by a fault detection subsystem, like a Decision Module
(DM) and a Redundancy Management Units (RMUs) in designs based on the Simplex
architecture [10,63,69,70] and the SPIDER [26, 50,66,67] respectively.
• The main difference with our approach with a fault-tolerant system (simplex architec-
ture) and with any other cyber-attack tolerant control system developed previously, is
that in our approach, we are proposing a switching process that is independent of the
detection of a cyber-attack to the controller software. Our supervisor module switches
the redundant controllers proactively, continuously with the specifications and require-
ment to accomplish the control objectives, the physical constraint and the security of
the physical components of a CPS.
The remaining part of the chapter is devoted discuss the challenges of our approach.
5.1.2 CHAPTER ORGANIZATION
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the system and attack model.
In Section 5.3 an attack-tolerant control strategy is given. In Section 5.4 an analysis and
performance of the control strategy are presented, and Section 5.5 presents the validation of
the strategy through simulations.
5.2 SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODELS
5.2.1 SYSTEM MODEL
In this chapter, an embedded control system that drives the physical plant in a CPS is
considered. This kind of CPS uses an interface to interact with the user or other physical
systems. This interfaces may be utilized for transmitting the plant states and sensors values
or receiving new set points and operation plans. These processes must be executed in a
bounded time, or the system may crash.
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5.2.2 ATTACK MODEL
In this research, an adversary that uses a chain of compromised machines to exploit the
control software of an embedded controller as a sensitive target in a CPS is considered. The
scenario wherein the controller is hijacked and a harmful control signal is injected into the
control loop is considered as well (see Fig 8). In this chapter, we are assuming the following
attacker capabilities:
• The attacker does not have access to the sensor and actuator, which implies that the
values reported by the sensor are trusted and commands sent to the actuators are
executed accordingly.
• The attacker requires an external interface to launch an attack on the control software
like serial ports or the network.
• The adversary has unlimited access to software resource.
We focus only on the safety and security of the software that provides control over the
physical system.
The approach of this chapter does not guarantee the safety of the physical plant if the
system is susceptible to sensor jamming attacks. Also, it does not mitigate network attacks
such as man-in-the-middle or DoS attacks that restrict network access [1].
5.3 ATTACK-TOLERANT CONTROL STRATEGY
In this chapter a modification of a dual redundant fault-tolerant system, which consists
of two identical controllers, called Controller 1 (C1) and Controller 2 (C2), which are peri-
odically switched between active mode and restart mode, is used as a basic architecture. A
scheme of this architecture is presented in Fig 9. In this paper, we understand that a con-
troller is in active mode when it is receiving the sensor’s data and generating the output to
the actuator in the physical plant. A controller is in restart mode, if it has been disconnected
from the sensors and actuators, and it is in a reboot process. Here we have considered a
full controller reset, and control software reloads as a prophylactic mechanism that ensures
that uncorrupted software is running in the controller immediately after finishing the restart
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Figure 8. Attack scenario: An adversary that seeks to exploit the control software of an embedded
controller in a CPS trough a chain of compromised machines is considered. The attacker does not
have access to the sensors and actuators and requires an external interface like the network to lunch
an attack to the controller software.
process. We understand that a controller is in a hot-backup mode; it is fully operative and
ready to be connected to the control system. In the rest of this chapter, when we refer to
controllers Ci and Cj we are summing that i 6= j.
5.3.1 BASIC STRATEGY
Like the fault-tolerant design, our cyber-attack tolerant control design is a control strat-
egy; its architecture is presented in Fig 9. A description of our approach is given as follows:
1. At any time t, only one of the controller is in active mode and the other one is in
restart mode or in hot-back up mode.
2. Every controller is isolated from the other one; it means that there is no intercommuni-
cation between both of them. In that way, if an adversary has corrupted the controller
software in Ci, there is not chance to spread the corrupter software to Cj.
3. If Ci is in active mode, and Cj has finished its restarts process, that is that Cj is
in hot-back up mode, then at time τ a switching signal σ(τ), switch the controllers,
that means that Ci is disconnected and starts its reboot process and that Cj is is in
active mode. The same strategy is repeated periodically at times 2τ, 3τ · · · , alternating
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Figure 9. Scheme of a dual redundant cyber-attack tolerant control system. Two identical
controllers are switched periodically between active and restart modes. The controller software is
loaded to the controller that is in the restart process from a read-only module. An isolate supervisor
module coordinates the switching signal .
the operational mode of C1 and C2. The time τ is called the period of the switching
process.
4. The switching process is coordinated by a specifically designed discrete logic that is
called a supervisor module [30, 31, 43] (see Fig 9). The supervisor uses the measure-
ments to generate the switching signal. In our strategy, the supervisor generates a
switching signal only if controller Ci is active (generating inputs to the plants), and
controller Cj is in hot-back-up mode, and the measurements show that the physical
plant is in steady-state. The construction of a logic that commands the switching
between controllers is beyond the scope of this paper; for a reader interested in this
topic see [30,31,43,51] and the references therein.
According to the experience, only switching and restarting the controllers does not in-
crease the difficulty for the attackers to penetrate the system again. Minimization of the
switching period, the integrity of the switching signal, and the secure execution of the restart
process are some of the key components of our design that are analyzed in the following sub-
section.
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5.3.2 REQUIREMENTS OF THE BASIC STRATEGY
Let’s denote with tr the time required to restart a controller and with ta the time necessary
for an adversary to compromise the same controller.
• The switching process is only possible if the controller that is not in active mode, has
finished its restart process and is in hot-back up mode. The supervisor module switches
the controller only if τ ≥ tr.
• If an adversary is attacking the control software of Ci, and Ci is switched to its restart
process, then all the attacker’s activity is cleaned by resetting Ci. The strategy is
valid only if the switching period holds τ < ta. Then a condition for the cyber-attack
tolerant strategy is given by
tr ≤ τ < ta (40)
• Every controller that is in a restart process must be isolated, and the system software
must be loaded into memory from a read-only storage unit protecting the system from
intruders (see Fig 9), so the software in this process is uncorrupted.
• The switching signal is a critical variable to achieve the security goals of the proposed
strategy and needs to be secure and incorruptible, then isolation of the supervisor
module is required to protect manipulations of the switching process from adversaries.
The control architecture proposed in this paper is a switched system, and the stability
and performance of the physical plant must be analyzed in this context. The next section is
devoted to this analysis.
5.4 ANALYSIS OF STABILITY AND PERFORMANCE
5.4.1 SWITCHED SYSTEMS
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A switched system can be described mathematically by a differential equation of the form
x˙(t) = fσ(t)(x(t)) (41)
where σ : [0,+ inf) → P ⊂ Z+ is a piecewise constant function of time that is called
switching signal and {fm : m ∈ P} is a family of sufficiently regular functions from Rn to
Rn. A particular case where all the individual subsystems are linear is called a switched
linear system and is given by the equation
x˙(t) = Aσ(t)x(t) (42)
The basic architecture proposed in this paper has switched signal
σ(t) =
1, if nτ ≤ t < (n+ 1)τ with n even2, if nτ ≤ t < (n+ 1)τ with n odd (43)
and can be represented as
x˙(t) =
f1(x(t)), if nτ ≤ t < (n+ 1)τ with n evenf2(x(t)), if nτ ≤ t < (n+ 1)τ with n odd (44)
In general, a switched system might become unstable for specific switched signals, even
if every individual system is asymptotically stable [43]. Is possible to restrict the switching
signals to a class of admissible inputs that guaranty stability [32, 43, 53]. According to our
approach, we are interested in switch controllers as fast as possible without compromise the
system stability. The Dwell time is a positive real number τD [51], that is defined as the
minimum value of the time intervals between consecutive time samples in which switching
occurs. It has been shown that sufficient large dwell time can guarantee the stability of the
system provided that all individual plants are stable [32]. In this context, we can restrict
the switching signals to a class of signals with the property that the interval between any
two consecutive switching times is not smaller than τD. From those above, it is clear that
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our basic strategy is effective if the individual systems f1 and f2 are stables and if
tr ≤ τD ≤ τ < ta (45)
with τD “slow enough”. The problem of a “ slow enough” dwell time is that a slow switching
system may facilitate the adversary objectives, which means that an adversary may have
enough time to compromise the controller (ta ≤ τD ≤ τ) and destabilize or damage the
physical plant. Is clear that a “fast switching system” is required to guarantee inequality
(45). Faster switching is discussed in the following subsection.
5.4.2 FAST SWITCHING
For the sequel, let’s assume that the process to be controlled is modeled by a linear,
time-invariant, stabilizable and detectable system of the form
x˙ = Ax+Bu, y = Cx (46)
with
state constraints: aTi x ≤ 1, i = 1, · · · , p (47)
control constraints: bTj u ≤ 1, j = 1, · · · , q (48)
The state and control constraints represent the physical constraints of the physical system,
and usually, they are called hard constraints [69,70]. The set of all the states that holds (47)
is called a set of admissible states, and the set of all inputs that holds (48) is called a set of
admissible inputs. The safety of the physical system is concerned with the operation of the
system without violating the physical constraints. In this venue, we take as a given a finite
family of controllers with the property that, for each σ(t) ∈ P , the feedback interconnection
is asymptotically stable. Let then
x˙ = Aσ(t)x (49)
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denote the switched system that results from the σ(t)th such interconnection.
If the matrices Aσ(t) commute pairwise, i.e., AkAl = AlAk for k, l ∈ P the switched system
(49) is asymptotically stable for any switched signal because every individual Aσ(t) in (49)
is stable [43].
In [54] and [51], an important observation was made in the sense that, the dwell time
τD > 0 can be arbitrarily short, without sacrificing stability for switching between finite
families of identically configured controllers.
Since in our basic strategy, we are using two identically configured controllers; then in
(49) we have to identical closed loop transition matrices A1 = A2 , obviously A1A2 = A2A1,
then the closed loop system (49) is asymptotically stable for any σ(t) ∈ P = {1, 2} because
A1 and A2 are both stable [43]. For those above, our basic architecture for the system (46)-
(49) is asymptotically stable no matter how small is the dwell time τD > 0. In the context
of our strategy, since the switching period τ is greater or equal to the dwell time τD, then
the switching period that guarantees the physical plant stability, depends only on the time
tr required for fully restart the controller, and in consequence, depends on the controller
platform, its operative system and reset strategies. The fully restart time for some platforms
that range between 45ms and 2031ms has been reported in [1] and resetting strategies to
minimize the fully restart time has been implemented in [4].
Remark 5.4.1. Since the dwell time is not a constraint for the stability of our switched
system, in the rest of this paper, we will take the time required for fully restart the controller
platform as its dwell time, that is τD = tr
Is well known that the transients caused by switching controllers may not be desired for
some systems, to deal with this issue, in [32] the authors showed that this kind of transients
could be avoided by suitable choice of the realizations for the controllers.
5.4.3 DIVERSIFICATION
A first assumption is that the application software that executes both controllers is identi-
cal; the main problem of this scenario is that if an adversary finds and attacks a vulnerability
in the software of one of the controllers, he may exploit the same vulnerability on the other
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Figure 10. Software and hardware diversification on the controllers may increase the difficulty of
compromising a controller by an adversary. The stepping stone cost of attack one may be different
from the attack two at least in the last step.
controller faster making more vulnerable our strategy. To increase the tolerance of our
switching system; software and hardware for every controller platform must be considered,
with the only requirement that the final result is two identical controllers. From the at-
tacker’s perspective, the stepping stone path to attack the controllers may be different at
least in the last step (see Fig 10). This diversification together with the switching process
changes the cost of the stepping stone attack as faster as the switching process.
5.4.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE INERTIA
In the switching process, it is assumed that the loss of a few control cycles is manageable
and does not have dramatic consequences to the controlled process [19]. This assumption is
justified by the fact that, for some applications, values do not change significantly from one
cycle to another, because the physical components have certain intrinsic inertia. However, it
is necessary to have an upper bound for the time of period that the physical plant can be safe
without any active control input. In this venue, let’s consider the stabilization problem, with
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feedback control in the form u = −Kx, where the gain K was designed by any methodology
like Linear Quadratic Regulation (LQR) or pole placement, etc. Then the closed loop system
is writing as
x˙ = Aσ(t)x, with constrains αlx ≤ 1 (50)
where Aσ(t) = A− BK and αl = ai, l = 1, · · · , p and αl = −bjK, l = p + 1, · · · , p + q, and
j = 1, · · · , q. According to the Liapunov stability theory, the system (50) is asymptotically
stable if and only if there is a positive definite matrix P such that ATσ(t)P + PAσ(t) < 0,
or QATσ(t) + Aσ(t)Q < 0 with Q = P
−1. Is possible to show that the stability region of the
system (50) is given by the state space set
S = {x : (x− xc)TP (x− cc) ≤ 1}, (51)
that is an ellipsoid with a center in xc, but also, if all estates of S satisfy the physical
constraints, then all the trajectories of the systems will satisfy the physical constraints of
the system and S is called safety region [69, 70]. If the system loses its controller at time
t = l, then the system dynamic for t ≥ l is given by
˙˜x(t) = Ax(t) + E, (52)
where E = Bδel is a constant matrix with δel denoting the last control input delivered by
its active controller, then the evolution of the states is given by the solutions of equation
(52), where xl = x(l) its initial condition, then the time in which the system states are in
its safety region is given by the t-values that holds
(x˜(t)− xc)TP (x˜(t)− xc) < 1 (53)
If the control input is back online for some time in winch the left side of (53) is close to
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1, it may be that no one command can save the system for its damage or destruction due
to the inertia of the physical system. One way to deal with this issue and increase the
attack tolerance of our strategy is to decrease the value of the right side of (51) to any value
0 < c < 1, then a more conservative criterion is given for the t-values that holds
(x˜(t)− xc)TP (x˜(t)− xc) < c (54)
The region (54) is denoted with Sc. The selection of the c-value, depends basically on the
intrinsic inertia of the physical plant, and the controller capabilities. If all the trajectories
of Sc can be driven for any controller Ci inside of Sc, Sc is called recoverable region.
5.5 SIMULATIONS
For the simulation of our strategy, let’s consider a constant speed approximation of a
Cessna Citation 500 aircraft of the longitudinal linearized dynamics, when it is cruising and
altitude of 5000m and speed of 128.2m/ sec presented in [45]. The elevator angle (rad) is the
only input, and the pitch angle (rad), altitude (m), and altitude rate (m/ sec) are output.
The systems is given by x˙ = Ax+Bu with output y = Cx+Du, where
A =

−1.2822 0 0.98 0
0 0 1 0
−5.4293 0 −1.8366 0
−128.2 128.2 0 0









0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
−128.2 128.2 0 0






For the purpose of this example, we will pretend that this is an accurate representation
of a UAV aircraft dynamics. The elevator angle is limited to ±15◦ (±0.262 rad), and the
elevator slew rate is limited to ±30◦/ sec (±0.524 rad/ sec). These are limits imposed by the
equipment design, and cannot be exceeded. The pitch angle is limited to ±20◦ (±0.349 rad).
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To implement our cyber-attack tolerant control strategy, two identical Linear Quadratic
Regulator (LQR) controllers with gain K =
[
0.9192 −1.4028 −0.1659 −0.0058
]
are used
according to the architecture presented in Fig 9. We investigate the effectiveness of our





state feedback input is given by u = −Kx, and since x =
[




|u| = |0.9192x1 − 1.4028x2 − 0.1659x3 − 0.0058x4 + 0.2030| ≤ 0.262,
|x2| ≤ 0.349,
|u˙| ≤ 0.524.
Normal operations: Fig 11 presents the normal operation plant simulated for 10 sec;
in this simulation, only one LQR controller has been used.
System under attack: With the purpose of analyzing the sensitivity of the physical
system when an adversary compromises the controller software and disrupt the control input,
a synthetic attack is simulated. First, with a switching period of 5 sec. Fig 12 presents the
scenario where an adversary has compromised the controller software of the active controller
at a time t = 4 sec, such that the controller delivers a constant input δe = 10
◦ for one second,
after that the switched system is activated at time t = 5 sec switching the controllers. As the
figure shows, the system is stabilized, but in the process, the constraints have been violated,
which means that the aircraft has been damaged or destroyed. Second, with a switching
period of 4.5 sec. In Fig 13, the switching system is activated after 0.5 sec after the attack
has started; in this case, after switching the controllers, the system is stabilized without
violation of constraints. In both simulations, the controllers have been switched just once in
order to observe the stabilization process after an attack.
Fast switching: Since in our architecture, the dwell time τD and consequently the
switching period τ ≥ τD can be as faster as the time tr required for fully restart the controller
platform, and assuming that tr = 0.1 sec, we have simulated our strategy for a switching
period of τ = tr = 0.1 sec, the results are presented in Fig 14. In this simulation, the
switching process is activated from the very beginning, and as the simulations show, the
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Figure 11. Cessna Citation 500: Altitude stabilization to 35m thought of an LQR controller with
gain K = [0.9192 − 1.4028 − 0.1659 − 0.0058], the elevator angle (rad) is the only input, and
the pitch angle (rad), altitude (m), and altitude rate (m/s) are the outputs.
closed loop system is asymptotically stable as expected due to the controllers being identical,
but also there are no transient disturbances due to the switching process, and its performance
is comparable to the system performance under only one controller (Fig 11). This behavior
is basically because LQR controllers are classified as robust controllers, but also because, in
our simulation, we are assuming that all the state measurements are available. If not all
the state measurements are available, and the estimation of some states are necessary, the
transient induced by the switching process may be more notorious. If no one attacker can
compromise the controller software in less than 0.1 sec, our system would be resilient to this
kind of attack, but also if an attacker can compromise the controller software in less than
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0.1 sec, this attack will not last more than 0.1 sec, and as we show in Fig 13, the system will
tolerate this kind of attack if it lasts less than 0.5 sec.
Safety region: Since the LQR gain K is given, the closed loop matrix Aσ(t) = A−BK
is completely determined, and its safety region is given by the ellipsoid R = {x : xTPx ≤ 1}
where P > 0 andATσ(t)P+PAσ(t) < 0 [13,69]. Since the matricesK and P are not uniques, the
stability region is not unique, then in order to calculate the maximum time that the physical
system is safe without control input, we will maximize the ellipsoid {x : xTPx ≤ 1}, and since
the volume of the ellipsoid R is proportional to the determinant det(P )−1/2, maximizing the
volume of the ellipsoid R is equivalent to minimizing det(Q−1) where Q = P−1 [13]. Then
we can formulate the following LMI for the optimization;
minimize log[det(Q−1)] (55)
subject to Q > 0; (56)
QATσ(t) + Aσ(t)Q < 0; (57)








































that give us Q−1 = P , with
P =

229.4178 −262.7811 −20.7218 −1.6741
−262.7811 312.8974 24.2148 1.9254
−20.7218 24.2148 2.2846 0.1501
−1.6741 1.9254 0.1501 0.0122
 (59)
Limitations of inertia: The period that the physical system will be in its stabil-
ity region holding its state constraints after disconnecting its controller is given by the
t-values that hold the inequality (53) with center in xc = [0 0 0 35]
T , and with the
optimal matrix P given in equation (59), for example at t = 4 the system states are
x(4) =
[
−0.0122 0.0017 −0.0050 33.4933
]T
, if the controller is disconnected and the
actuator holds the last control input u(t) = δel = 0.2290
◦ (0.0040 rad) for t > 4, then the
system will be in its safety region for 3.8 sec, and if the actuators do not hold the last input,
and by default it is u(t) = δel = 0 for t > 4, then the system will be in its safety region for
7.4 sec.
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Figure 12. Cessna Citation 500 under attack for 1 sec: Switching period of 5 sec. At time t = 4
sec, an adversary that has compromised the control software of the active controller, introduce a
constant input to the elevator δe = 10
◦, after one second the controllers are switched. At time t = 5
sec, the new active controller delivers an input less than its constraint −15◦. Since this constraint
is a physical limitation of the elevator, it cannot be exceeded, then for a period the elevator angle
has a constant value δ = −15◦, that means that is this period the system evolves as an open loop,
after that the controller drives the system to its set point. The aircraft loses around 10m when
the attack starts and loses around 40m in the next 2 sec. The pitch angle violates its constraints,
during and after the attack.
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Figure 13. Cessna Citation 500 under attack for 0.5 sec: Switching period of 4.5 sec., at time t = 4
sec, an adversary that has compromised the control software of the active controller, introduce a
constant input δe = 10
◦, after 0.5 sec the controllers are switched, and the new active controller
drives the aircraft to its set point. Even that the transient induced in the outputs by the attacks, do
not violate the system constraints, we cannot say that the system has tolerated the attack, because
the size and velocity of the transients may cause any permanent damage to the aircraft structure.
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Figure 14. Elevator angle (input), pitch angle, altitude, and altitude rate driven by our dual
redundant cyber-attack tolerant switched system with a switching period of 0.1 sec.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE REASERCH
6.1 CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, we have faced the problem of risk assessment and risk mitigation
for stepping stone attacks. For the risk assessment problem, we have proposed a formal
mathematical model as a multi-agent dynamical system that includes an interplay between
graph theory, differential equations, and min-plus algebra. The result of the model is an
equation in differences that provides the most vulnerable stepping stone path from an attack
source to a sensitive target. Because embedded controllers are omnipresent in networks, as
a part of the risk mitigation problem, we have proposed a controls system that is tolerant
to cyber-attacks.
The problem of risk assessment of stepping stone attacks in networks with fixed and
switching topology is addressed in Chapter 3. In this chapter, the stepping stone cost is
modeled as a multi-agent dynamical system in a vulnerability graph with fixed and switching
topology. A biased min-consensus protocol is used for distributed calculation of the shortest
path, and since the network is monitored in discrete time, the model is discretized using min-
plus algebra for modeling and analysis. Theorem 3.3.1 and Corollary 3.3.1 prove that the
stepping stone dynamics in a vulnerability graph with fixed topology converge to the shortest
path in a finite time given k = n − 1 instant communications. Theorem 3.3.2 provides a
metric for the time interval between switching signals that guarantees convergence to the
minimum path for the switching topology case.
The problem of risk assessment developed in Chapter 3 is expanded in Chapter 4, where
we have presented a mathematical model for the analysis of the stepping stone attacks when
attackers employ multiple strategies to choose stepping stones. The problem is formulated
as an AQSPP in a dynamic vulnerability graph with a multi-agent system approach. This
approach allows modeling the scenario when the attacker uses one strategy constrained by
69
another. As a result, the most vulnerable stepping stone path that satisfies both conditions
is calculated, which can be interpreted as the stepping stone path most likely to succeed.
Theorem 4.2.1 and Theorem 4.3.1 provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a
finite time convergence to the shortest path for the stepping stone attack models with a
maximum degree and maximum impact, respectively, and show that can be solved as the
SPP. The models can be expanded quickly for the case of vulnerability graphs with switching
topology [23], using equation (22) with γij(l) or γˆij(i) instead of ij(l) for every vulnerability
graph Gl.
The risk mitigation problem has been addressed showing that is possible to design control
systems that are tolerant to cyber-attacks. As an example, in this dissertation, a dual
redundant controls system strategy for embedded controllers that is tolerant to cyber-attacks
has been proposed as a risk mitigation strategy.
In Chapter 5, a dual redundant switching control system has been proposed as a cyber-
attack tolerant control system for a plant in a CPS that can be approximated by a linear
time-invariant system with the property that is stabilized and detectable. The asymptotic
stability of our switched system together with a frequently reset and restart process of the
controllers for any positive switching period in our strategy is possible and depends only
on time required for fully resetting and restarting the controller platform. The proposed
strategy is effective if and only if the fully reset and restart time of the controller is faster
than the time required for an adversary to compromise the controller. The simulation results
demonstrate that the calculation of the stability and safety regions, the limitations of the
inertia, diversification, and performance, depends on the physical plant and the choice of the
controller’s platforms.
6.2 FUTURE RESEARCH
Different research problems related to this dissertation can be proposed. To mention a
few:
1. For the model developed in Chapter 3, Theorem 3.3.2 provides an lower bound for the
time interval between switching signals that guarantees convergence to the shortest
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path for the switching topology case. In this context, is there a minimum lower bound?,
i.e., is there a minimum k ≤ n−1 that guarantee the convergence to the shortest path?
2. The model develop in Chapter 4 solved the AQSPP, a following question is if this
methodology can be expanded to attempt to solve the general QSPP.
3. The models presented in Chapters 3 and 4 will be modified and expanded to analyze
problems related to mission impact analysis and moving target defense.
4. We plan to extend our strategy from a dual redundant control system (Chapter 5)
to a multiple redundant control system, as long as all the controllers are identical.
This may increase the robustness of our strategy, but also can decrease the switching
period, for example if we have three controllers C1, C2 and C3 we can organize the
system such that when one is in active mode, the second one is hot back up mode and
the last one is in restart mode, then the switching period can be less than the time
required for fully resetting and restarting the controller platform. Randomly switched
mode of operation [16,46] will be studied in the context of our approach with multiple
redundant strategies. We also plan to study the effectiveness of the strategy in the
case of nonlinear plants.
5. The diversification in the controllers impact the dwell time and stability. In [51] the
author has proved that if the plant is observable and if the transition matrices of the
closed loop commute, the switching system is asymptotically stable for any positive
dwell time, an equivalent result will be studied for the MIMO case.
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